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CULTURAL CHANGE AND MILITARY RESISTANCE IN ARAUCANIAN CHILE, 1550-1730

ROBERT CHARLES PADDEN

101 131 175

THE TERM "ARAUCANIAN CULTURE" suggests a definition and unity which is more applicable to present-day aborigines of Chile than to the culture which the Spaniards encountered in the sixteenth century. While the great majority of Chilean Indians were closely related in race, language, and culture, there were minor variations among them.[1] Those differences, however, were infrequently heeded by the Spanish invaders. Thinking in geographical rather than ethnological terms, and measuring culture with reference to military proficiency, the Spanish chroniclers postulated three spatial bands of culture, the first extending from the Aconcagua to the Nuble River; the second from the Nuble to the Imperial River; the third from there to the Gulf of Reloncaví.[2] Within these regions the Indians were of a single Mapuche culture, as they so identified themselves. Peoples living to the north of any given Mapuche group, although still within it, were identified as Picunche, those to the south as Huilliche.[3] The Spaniards applied these denominations to their conception of cultural distribution, thus making them appear to be racio-cultural entities, which, of course, they were not.[4]

The one outstanding difference among these three groups, as the Spaniards saw them, was the ability of the central band to resist effective Spanish settlement, not only through the sixteenth century, but, as it developed, into the late decades of the nineteenth century. The Araucanian culture in which the present paper is

1 For discussion of Chilean pre-history see Francisco Antonio Encina, *Historia de Chile desde la prehistoria hasta 1891* (19 vols., Santiago, 1940-51), vol. 1, chaps. ii, iii; Ricardo E. Latcham, *La prehistoria chilena* (Santiago, 1928), pp. 147-154, *passim*.

2 Miguel de Olaverría, "Informe de don Miguel de Olaverría sobre el reyno de Chile, sus indios y sus guerras" (in Claudio Gay, *Historia física y política de Chile*, Paris, Santiago, 1844-71). This work comprises twenty eight volumes, two of which are document collections, numbered I and II, hence, Gay, II, pp. 19-20. Olaverría was an old soldier in Chile when he wrote his chronicle in 1594. His work is both dependable and readable. Also see "Viaje de García Hurtado de Mendoza al sur de Valdivia y fundación de Osorno" (Gay, I, pp. 224-225).

3 Encina, vol. 1, pp. 72-74; cf. Latcham, *La prehistoria*, pp. 152-154.

4 The term Picunche did not come into vogue until the seventeenth century. Writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries accepted and compounded these delineations. In addition to these three areas the Spaniards further differentiated between the Picunche, who extended somewhat south of the Maule River, and the *Promaucaes*, who lived between the Nuble River and the Biobío, including the site of Concepción. The Promaucaes were extremely warlike, but since they lived north of the Biobío they were not Araucanians in the proper sense, nor did they make up any part of the *estado* (see note 29).

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101 131 175 interested is limited to the widest Spanish designation, that is, those Indians between the Nuble and Imperial Rivers, and, more precisely, the area which today comprises the province of Arauco. This tiny province, some sixty miles long and twenty wide, was the focal point of Araucanian resistance.

175 The Spanish conquest of Araucanian Chile began in 1550 when Pedro de Valdivia and his followers built a fort and founded the town of Concepción on the northern bank of the Biobío River. From this point they moved south, inflicting military defeats on the Araucanians and dividing them in encomienda. Within three years the Spaniards had ranged below the Calle-Calle River, founding towns and reducing most of the Indians to servitude. The Indians were restive under this imposition of Spanish dominion, but offered no openly unified resistance. On the heels of this initial pacification Valdivia brought in experienced prospectors and miners from Santiago to search out the gold deposits that were believed to exist. The gold-seekers enjoyed incredible success: several strikes were made which yielded nuggets the size of almonds. *"Desde agora,"* quoth Valdivia, *"comienzo a ser señor."*[5]

669 But the Araucanians were not of like mind. Rapid development of the mines and discoveries of new ones portended undisguised slavery. Under such apprehension the Indians of Tucapel contrived a cunning trap for Valdivia into which [366] he fell, and he was then killed and eaten.[6] This signal event inspired a general uprising which lasted for four years, ending with the death of the Indian leader Lautaro in the battle of Peteroa in 1557.[7] Although the general rebellion was ended at this time, the War of Arauco was begun. The Indians of Arauco, Tucapel, Catiray, and Purén (the present province of Arauco and its peripheries) stubbornly resisted effective Spanish settlement. This phase of the struggle lasted [366] until 1598, when the Indians captured and ate Governor Martín García de Loyola.[8] There followed a spontaneous rebellion of subjugated Indians from the Maule River to Osorno in the south: every Spanish town worthy of the designation was wiped out below the Biobío, with the exception of Castro on the Isle

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[147] 5 Alonso de Góngora Marmolejo, "Historia de Chile desde su descubrimiento hasta el año de 1575" (in *Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional*, 49 vols., Santiago, 1861-1942), vol. 2, pp. 33-34 (this collection will hereafter be cited as CHC). Marmolejo came to Chile with Valdivia in 1549, hence he wrote with considerable experience and authority. His work is fundamental to the study of Araucanian culture.

6 *Idem*, pp. 37-39. Marmolejo's account of Valdivia's death is based on an eyewitness account, hence it is more acceptable than are the many others that are based on rumors and hearsay.

7 For a survey of the first general uprising see Encina, vol. 1, chaps. viii and ix.

8 *Idem*, vol. 2, chap. xxiii; also see Gregorio Serrano, "Relación de lo subcedido en Chile desde veinte de diciembre de noventa y ocho hasta primero de mayo de noventa y nueve" (CHC, vol. 45, pp. 227-233).

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of Chiloé.[9] Thus by 1600 the Spaniards, in spite of heavy expenditures of blood and treasure, faced a triumphant foe across the Biobío.

This impasse which marked the turn of the century suggests the central problem in understanding Araucanian culture. What faculty or genius did the Araucanians possess which enabled them to succeed so brilliantly where other indigenous American cultures had failed? How was it possible for the Araucanian warriors to boast rightfully, after some fifty years of warfare, that the Spaniards knew almost as much about the military art as they did?[10] Historians have been prone to avail themselves of superficially reasonable explanations: most cite the numerical superiority of the Indians; some blame the forest because it hampered the functions of the Spanish cavalry; others stress the overly long lines of supply from Peru, coupled with a chronic lack of viceregal interest. These factors are joined to a common belief that the Araucanians simply adopted the Spanish forms and techniques of war, making up in numbers what they lacked in skill. Chilean historians, especially since the nineteenth century when their homeland fought for independence from Spain, have quite happily viewed the historical record as a proof of Araucanian hence mestizo thence Chilean bravery and love of freedom. The point is that it is not merely a question of military science, topography, relative numerical strength, or racial declension. These may be significant particulars, but a war of survival between two ethnic groups implies a conflict of total cultures.

At once we are at a serious disadvantage because we have no such conception of early Araucanian culture, however well we may feel that we know the Spanish. By means of archaeological evidence and brief narratives of exploration we are able to piece together a rather crude notion of what Araucanian culture was like before the Spaniards came, but nothing more. Largely because the area under discussion became almost at once a zone of perpetual conflict, the work of the religious Orders did not develop as it did elsewhere in the Indies, and we keenly feel the lack of Mendicant chronicles. Consequently, most of our information concerning Araucanian life during the first century of conquest is derived from chronicles and histories of the war in which brief glimpses of Indian life all too infrequently appear. There are added limitations. Wherein the Indians were concerned, the chroniclers were seldom efficient observers. In matters of simple fact they tend to be trustworthy, but when the fact becomes interpretive they almost invariably fail to grasp the human thought and action that lays behind it. Rather than as

9 Alonso González de Nájera, "Desengaño y reparo de la guerra de Chile" (CHC, vol. 16, pp. 10-14, 63-65, *passim*). The author was in Chile from 1601 to 1607. Experienced in military science, he made a brave attempt to analyze Araucanian resistance. His work is invaluable for Araucanian study.

10 *Idem*, pp. 93-94.

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men, they thought of the Indians as wild savages who blindly resisted the sweet yoke of Christianity and Spanish dominion. For this reason they seldom inquired into the possibility of Indian method; rather, Indian resistance was madness. Another weakness inherent in the chronicles is the factor of cultural change. At any given moment the chroniclers made their notations in the belief that what they saw was and had been thus from the beginning of time. Only when contemporaries gave information which contradicted their own observations did they give evidence of change, but without attempting to explain it.

It is seldom wise to take an interpretive fact, as disclosed by one of the chroniclers, at its face value. When we are told, for instance, that the Spaniards lost a given battle because the Indians outnumbered them it is entirely unlikely that the chronicler is telling us the whole truth. We have every reason to doubt him because we already know that the Spaniards, with or without Indian allies, had an enormous talent for winning military victories with inferior numbers. At no time was it normal for Spanish forces to outnumber the enemy anywhere in the Indies. Why, then, did the Indians win not only the battle in question, but a majority of their engagements? The suggestions are several: perhaps the Indians, in their own right, had become superior strategists; perhaps they had improved their own weapons to a point which offset the Spanish advantages of gunpowder and horse; perhaps they had developed a creed for life which made resistance both possible and meaningful. Our questioning of an apparently reliable fact leads us to recognition of a neglected factor, the potentiality of early Araucanian culture. By following these suggestions through and corroborating them with associated evidence, we may well come to an understanding of that particular battle which is far superior to that entertained by the chronicler. More importantly, when the battle is multiplied by 1000 and the conditions of Spanish defeat remain relatively constant, significant conclusions concerning Araucanian culture are inescapable.

By the passing of the first generation of Conquistadores the war had become institutionalized, and observers began to think and write about it historically. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries several histories of Chile and its Araucanian War were written which contained a relative abundance of passages describing Indian life. These writers, like their predecessors in the sixteenth century, did not take into account the factor of cultural change, and their judgments were almost entirely based upon the present in which they observed and wrote. Nor did they, with few exceptions, have the opportunity of consulting the major chronicles of the sixteenth century. Most of those manuscripts were sent to Spain for publication, but a good many of them were intentionally or innocently shuttled off to a dark repository to await the dawn of modern historiography on Chilean historians.

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There are thus three categories of documentary materials from which to draw an image of Araucanian culture: the chronicles of first contact; the chronicles and documents of the first century of conquest; and the histories of the later colonial period. In past reconstructions scholars have tended to assign cultural forms found in later and better documented periods to earlier periods wherein documentation is not generously provided. With disregard for the depth of time, elements have been taken from documentary sources of the entire colonial period and placed side by side in a synchronic mosaic. At best this type of reconstruction is an abstraction of culture, and, like any abstraction, it is essentially unreal. Nowhere does it give a hint of the potentiality of Araucanian culture: on the contrary, such description lends itself to demonstration of a culture which, by the lessons of historical anthropology, should never have survived the first Spanish onslaught. Such reconstruction follows from a basic assumption of cultural constancy. In some phases of material culture this technique is doubtless warranted and valid, especially in the presence of sufficient archaeological documentation. However this may be, the idea of constancy stands in opposition to the idea of change, and from what can be made of the documents, the strength with which the Araucanians resisted Spanish domination was derived not from a constancy of their cultural forms, but from the ability to change them. It seems valid, therefore, to view the sources of the later colonial period as indication of what Araucanian culture *became* under the stress of the long Spanish war rather than as evidence of what it was before the conquest.

The chronicles of the first century of conflict, when viewed from this position and subjected to critical analysis, provide considerable insight into the design of cultural transformation and suggest a functional hypothesis underlying cultural change. The term culture in the present case does not refer to fine art and letters and the numerous connotations usually associated with the term. Such development was not a concomitant of war, nor, it seems clear, did the Araucanians tend in the direction of refined sensibility. Araucanian cultural development occurred only in those arts which had a survival value, and was canalized by the hostile forces which threatened the total culture. Spanish pressure was exerted in three areas — military, political, and religious. The Araucanians, under the stimulus of this external pressure, turned inward upon themselves and developed their own corresponding forms to a point of equal resistive strength. The Spanish challenge in terms of relative force of impact was first military, secondly political, and lastly religious. Araucanian reaction and response to the challenge followed the same gradient.

The founding of Concepción by Valdivia in 1550 marked the real beginning of Araucanian resistance. Located just across the Biobío, out of Araucanian territory proper, it served as a strategic base of operations and a key position of

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175 Spanish strength. Before its foundation the Spaniards posed a transient threat, but after it began to serve as a springboard for trans-Biobío conquest and settlement the Indians better understood the consequences involved. With alarming speed the Spanish moved southward, through the provinces of Arauco, Catiray, Tucapel, Purén, and Marigueño, coming to a temporary halt at the Calle-Calle River. This entire area, bordered on the west by the sea and on the east by the camino real (the easiest passage through the central valley), was divided in encomienda, Arauco, Tucapel, and Purén being retained by Valdivia as the basis of a princely estate.[11] These provinces, especially Arauco, were highly prized by the Spaniards as the most heavily populated of the whole kingdom, and as possessing an abundance of food stuffs, fine lands, and a most provident climate.[12]

621 Within this area the Indians lived in small, decentralized kinship groups, with no apparent inter-group relationship of an institutional nature. The sources of the sixteenth century are so meagre as to preclude the possibility of clear understanding of the socio-political divisions within the individual group. The local clusters of dwellings, in early chronicles called *levos*, in later ones *reguas*, composed a larger unit known as the *allaregua* (or *aillarewe*). Each allaregua was composed of nine or less levos. Olaverría, writing in 1594, describes this area as consisting of only five allareguas, but the context in which he mentions them suggests that this semi-centralization was of relatively recent origin.[13] There is no factual basis for postulating anything but a crude kinship relationship, markedly particularized by geographical isolation, at the time of the Spanish arrival.

177 These people, albeit ready warriors, were soundly defeated by Spanish arms and remained so for almost four years. Subsequent events, the revolt against Governor Valdivia in December, 1553, and the continuing War of Arauco, indicate quite clearly that this short peace was a period of Araucanian maturation. Through military action, service in encomienda, and free intercourse in the Spanish towns (Concepción, Imperial, Valdivia, and Villa Rica) they observed and learned much about Spanish military organization and strategy, government, social custom, mores, and religious concepts. The lessons they learned were adequately demonstrated in subsequent resistance against the invaders.

726 669 This initial period of communication with Spanish culture was constantly amplified throughout the following century. Military action was usually confined to the summer months. During harvest time and winter both Indians and Spaniards tended to refrain from active combat, holding what had been gained and preparing for summer campaigns. Through peaceful Indians, those serving the

11 Olagerría, p. 20.
12 Marmolejo, p. 25; Pedro de Valdivia to King, Sept. 25, 1551 (Gay, I, pp. 139-142).
13 Olaverría, p. 21.

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Spanish, the rebels kept themselves fully informed of all Spanish activity. Never lacking information, the Indians always had a precise idea of Spanish strength or weakness. There was seldom a rigid military perimeter; in those areas where the invader could maintain a fort and military supremacy the Indians were reduced to servitude. With a weakening of Spanish strength, rebellion inevitably occurred, so that the distinction as a peaceful or warlike Indian depended largely upon the state of affairs of the moment. Because the Indians so frequently changed roles, they were never out of personal contact with the Spanish.

The Indians received some aid and encouragement from Spanish deserters. There is no telling how many deserted to enemy ranks in the course of the sixteenth century, but in the year 1600 alone it is known that there were over sixty desertions.[14] A good many of these renegades were still living among the Indians in 1607.[15] In fear of peace and subsequent retribution, the traitors taught the Indians many things that would have been difficult for them to learn themselves, such as the proper use of firearms, building of forges and ironmongering, and even the techniques of political administration. The Spaniards were greatly perturbed when a mestizo powder-maker went over to the other side. With volcanic sulphur, saltpetre, and charcoal in abundance, the Indians could make deadly use of the large stores of field pieces and firearms which they had captured. As luck would have it, the deserter repented and returned to the Spanish fold, whereupon he was forgiven and permitted to return to Peru. There were also clerical renegades who apostatized and urged the Indians on in their own religious beliefs and practices.[16]

It is most important to understand that the motive for Araucanian observation of Spanish cultural forms was not to emulate them and thereby raise the level of their own, but to discover Spanish weaknesses and to mobilize Araucanian strength for forceful opposition. A fundamental weakness of Spanish occupation was its dire need of peace. Exploitation of this weakness became a cornerstone of Araucanian strategy throughout the sixteenth century and beyond. Spanish forces, both civilian and military, were too few and too widely dispersed, and the line of supply from Peru was much too long. Effective occupation and permanent settlement depended upon a guaranteed supply of Indian labor. This, of course, was in turn dependent upon total pacification, which would allow the colonists to concentrate on development of mining and agriculture rather than military defense. As experience in Mexico and Peru had shown, a mere handful of soldiers,

14 Encina, vol. 2, p. 306.

15 Nájera, p. 117.

16 *Idem*, pp. 117-122, 143-148, 69, 73-75. In spite of Spanish fears, firearms did not play a significant role in Indian strategy until late in the seventeenth century.

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723 colonists, and friars could work great wonders if the Indians would but submit. When they first settled Santiago the Spaniards proved that they could provide their living with their own hands, but full barns and producing mines were impossible of realization without Indian labor.[17] Because of this, the Spaniards always hungered for peace, and, through past experience in the Indies, expected it to follow each victory over the Indians.[18] This was the great error of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. Whenever the Indians found it advantageous to themselves to live in peace — whether because of famine or disease or military weakness — they willingly surrendered themselves to service in the encomienda, there to repair their fortunes and to watch. The Spaniards, hopeful that this was indeed the dawn of a new day, almost invariably sought immediate expansion of their mining and agricultural activities. With a quickening of economic activity, military vigilance declined to a point which invited rebellion. The Araucanians honored such invitations without fail.[19]

Spanish military strategy was also based upon the growing hunger for peace. From past experience the invaders knew that peace would follow the defeat and usurpation of a central authority. In the absence of a central Araucanian authority the only alternative was to instill fear by demonstration of military supremacy, and so the Spaniards constantly sought a definitive battle which, when won, would convince the Araucanians of the futility of resistance. Some civilians differed, advising an Indian policy founded upon kind treatment and remission of
725 personal service, but their voices were seldom heard. Recognizing the Spaniards' willingness to do battle, the Araucanians always chose their own battle sites where the terrain could be used to advantage, where the horse, as a military instrument, could be rendered less effective, and where their own strategies could be best effected. With monotonous regularity the Spaniards, always seeking the big victory, sent an army to defeat a rumored gathering of Indians, which rumor was usually broadcast by the Indians themselves. Upon arrival the Spaniards found

17 It should be kept in mind that conquest and settlement were private financial ventures, and very expensive ones. See Governor Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza's complaint in Mata-relaja, p. 90.

18 This was Valdivia's experience in Santiago; the Indians tired of "running like beasts" and submitted to subjection (Valdivia to King, Sept. 4, 1545, Gay, I, p. 61).

19 This technique of dissembling was practiced widely, both in Spanish towns and on the frontiers. The Indians were so skilled that the Spanish were never able to tell whether they really meant to keep the peace or not. Either way, there was nothing the Spanish could do but accept, driven as they were by the economic imperatives of their way of life. The Indians seem to have understood this perfectly. The granting of territorial peace in critical areas as a part of wider strategy became common. Revolts were well planned: the chiefs had the White women divided among themselves in advance; the gold that had been dug for the Whites during peace was thrown into the nearest river, or used to ransom Indian hostages; bloody revenge was visited upon the erstwhile masters. See Matarelaja, pp. 58-59, 125; Nájera, pp. 46-47, 63.

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themselves surrounded and outmaneuvered, and so were frequently forced to flee for their lives, leaving baggage trains in the hands of the enemy.[20]

It was military planning of this kind that led to the capture and death of Valdivia. Historians generally recognize the death trap into which he fell as the handiwork of Lautaro, the most famous strategist in all history. Lautaro has since become one of Chile's great national heroes, symbolizing all that was best in Araucanian culture. Be that as it may, there is considerable reason to believe that Lautaro hailed from the vicinity of Santiago, and was therefore an Araucanian by nothing more than association.[21] His relations with the Araucanians are not clear historically beyond the fact that he led their resistance, aided by other chiefs, until his death in 1557. He was extremely well versed in military strategy, and his deployment of squadrons in place of mass attack and the use of entrenchment were valued contributions to Araucanian knowledge, but the fact that many other military techniques were developed after he had passed from the scene would indicate that there were countless Araucanians of equal ability.

Generally speaking, the Araucanians retained their own weapons in the war against the Spanish. Bows and arrows, long lances, spears, long clubs with weighted heads, and slings were the weapons most often used.[22] Strategy was much more

20 For typical accounts see Mariñas, pp. 316., 85, 101, 171-176, 186-187. In the matter of Indian strategy and resistance the Spaniards could see no the forest for the trees. They held responsibility for their failures on everything but the Indians. A widely prevalent idea, as expressed by Martín Ruiz de Gamboa (Góngora, II, p. 133), held that some polished gentlemen gentlemen were needed to fight the Indians, ignorance cruder being unfit for the task. Discrimination against creoles was a common source of dissension in Spanish ranks. In 1557, García Hurtado de Mendoza arrived in Chile as Governor with many pretensions to his name. The attention with which he heeded the recommendations of his peninsular friends annoyed the Indian creoles. In his reply to their complaints he suggested that no more than a handful of the Chileans knew the meaning of their letters, and then tauntingly inquired, "Es qué se ensina aquí entre hijos de puta?" (Mariñas, p. 85). Núñez (pp. 36-37) took a more realistic view. He stated that creoles were born to war and carried the brunt of the fighting, and did it well. Because the chroniclers ignored their deeds, he added, they were unappreciated in Spain. He considered the disparity between creole and peninsular to be simply innate.

21 Mariñas simply states that among those who planned Valdivia's downfall was a young man named Alonso, who had been Valdivia's servant (p. 30). This brief notice is the only valid evidence of Lautaro's origin. Among the chroniclers in Chile the term yanacona invariably meant a friendly and allied Indian from the north. Chilean historians are prone to begin with the premise that he was an Araucanian, but have difficulty in explaining how he could have become so indoctrinated in the brief period between Valdivia's first contact with the Araucanians and his death. It seems much more likely that Lautaro was taken by Valdivia to Santiago where he was a boy. See Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Lautaro* (Santiago, 1878) for the standard nationalistic version.

22 Olivares, pp. 33-34; Núñez, pp. 95-98. For a plausible account of Araucanian reaction to the Spanish danger after 1570 see Ricardo Lenthaus, "La sociedad guerrera de los Araucanos: sus armas y métodos militares" (Revista Chilena de Historia y Geografía, vol. 15, no. 50, 1915, pp. 123-195). While this study is valuable for purely military details, it does not attempt to

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important than weapons. As noted above, the Indians never fought in a place that was not of their own choosing if they could avoid it. The horse was their greatest problem and one around which their strategy revolved. They chose battle sites wherein the horse would be difficult to manage; they made use of snares on long poles with which to pull the rider from his horse; they dug pitfalls and trenches, placing sharp stakes upon which rider and mount would be impaled; in all of this their chief aim was to get the Spaniard off his mount.[23]

Through the spoils of war and peacetime thievery the Indians acquired a vast supply of horses. By 1594 it was not uncommon for them to put several hundred horsemen in the field. It is to be noted, however, that they used the horse as an auxiliary rather than as an instrument of war. Riding as far as thirty miles a night they raided settlements and ranches under the cover of darkness, leaving death and destruction in their wake.[24] But acquisition of this new mobility did not alter their basic strategy for fighting Spanish forces. Throughout the sixteenth century they continued to lure Spanish troops into carefully prepared ambuscades, themselves remaining on foot. To have done otherwise would have undone their whole strategy. As the Spanish horsemen approached the main Indian force, their lines of retreat were closed by concentric rings of warriors. If the Spanish were fortunate enough to defeat the enemy they found no difficulty in retracing their steps. If, on the other hand, the Indians proved too strong for them, they could retreat only with great difficulty. Once having forced the Spaniards into retreat, the Indians followed them on foot. When the horses tired sufficiently, their riders could be struck down. A Spanish horseman afoot, because of the weight and bulk

explore or interpret the force behind Araucanian military organization beyond the factor of Indian bravery. Another weakness is the author's uncritical use of Pedro Mariño de Lovera's *Crónica del reino de Chile* (CHC, vol. 6). Lovera was another soldier who came to Chile in 1551, served there for a number of years, and then retired to Lima to write a history of Chile. Ostensibly because it was not well written, the manuscript was turned over to a Jesuit, Bartolomé de Escobar for rewriting. As a true courtier, he shifted emphasis to flatter his patron, Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, and otherwise took liberties which rendered the history worthless. After his revisions it was probably revised by Hurtado himself. A copy was subsequently discovered in Spain by Hurtado in suit for equal reward for services rendered. In like vein, Hurtado was irked at publication of Ercilla's *La Araucana*, which he felt slighted his person. In retaliation he commissioned Pedro de Oña to write his dull *Arauco Domado*, an epic in which Hurtado emerged as the conqueror of Arauco. As Nájera remarked, Oña merely made himself a fool in describing Arauco as subdued when in fact Arauco was more victorious and impregnable than ever before (pp. 36-37). See Diego Barros Arana, *Historia jeneral de Chile* (16 vols., Santiago, 1884-1902, vol. 2, pp. 282-288).

23 Marmolejo, pp. 44-49, 85, 62-63. John M. Cooper, "The Araucanians" (*Handbook of South American Indians*, Julian H. Steward, ed., Bulletin, Bureau of American Ethnology, no. 143, vol. 2, p. 697, 1946) is in error when he concludes that the Indians mastered European military tactics and strategy, making them their own.

24 Ghersetti, p. 34.

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of his equipment and his inability to dodge through the forest undergrowth, did not have a chance for his life.[36]

The idea of Indians running down horses is not as incredible as it at first seems. In the heat of summer, when most of the fighting took place, the Spanish mounts tired quickly, especially after the long trip to the Indian underlands. Besides this, the Araucanians were accustomed to hunting wild game by literally chasing it to death. This required a tireless run, at which they were proficient. Profiting by the lessons of their own strategy, the Araucanians devised an extremely light saddle in order to increase the endurance of their mounts on long rides. When they used captured Spanish saddles they first cut them down so as to make them considerably lighter.[37]

Shortly after the turn of the century, by 1611 to be exact, the Indians developed a cavalry that in terms of mobility was superior to the Spanish. They likewise possessed the best horses in the whole of Chile. These advantages were demonstrated in many raids on Spanish towns and a willingness to meet the Spanish cavalry on its own ground.[37] From this time forward the war passed into a new phase in which Araucanian offensive power became an increasingly significant factor. The source of that power, of course, lay in mastery of the horse. In little more than a generation the animal from which the Indians had once fled in terror had been incorporated into their culture, transforming it into a factor of defense military power, dedicated to the eradication of Spanish culture. The Spaniards were not only dismayed to recognize this development of Araucanian military strength, but were piqued as well at the sight of barbarous savages riding horses with an air of equality. In answer to Spanish reassurance the Indians pledged never to quit their war for freedom and their horses to some servitude on foot.[38]

The existence of a skilled and effective military force bespeaks the presence of a comparable political organization under whose genius it is formed and directed. In consolidating the development of Araucanian political organization the chronicles indicate two major forces at work: the geographical particularism in which the Araucanians traditionally lived and a common force generated by the presence of the enemy and inclining towards Araucanian unity. Throughout the first century

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35 Marmolejo, pp. 40-42, 47-49. There are few representations of enemy arch disciplines.

36 Núñez, pp. 42, 110-114. Cooper (p. 704) gives the impression that Indian saddles and riding gear were nothing more than crude imitations of Spanish models.

37 Núñez, pp. 107-110; "Informe de Juan de Xarquemendi," May 1, 1611 (Gay, II, p. 289); Xarquemendi to King, Jan. 29, 1611 and Jan. 30, 1612 (idem, pp. 345, 359-367); Alonso García Ramón to King, 1612 (idem, p. 367).

38 Núñez, p. 116. Whenever the Indians found it necessary to abandon in order to gain a temporary peace, the Spaniards duly noticed that they were to their horses and were about on foot, as military prowess was expected to do. The Indians inevitably turned to their mountains, keeping their good mark hidden for use after the war rebellion (idem, p. 139).

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[illegible] conquest ancient borders clashed with Araucanian nationalism. This conflict produced a political undercurrent which in itself contributed heavily to the cause of Araucanian independence. Consolidation of political-military authority was achieved to a point where successful resistance was possible, but did not develop to a stage where the Spaniards could deliver and carry it.

The center of anti-Spanish unity was founded in what the Spanish termed "el estado." This was a geographical expression signifying the area that Valdivia held in personal encomienda.[30] It was these Indians, particularly chiefs of Arauco, Tucapel, and Purén, who planned and carried out the revolt of 1553, and who assumed leadership of the resistance movement. After the first few years of bitter warfare the Spaniards began to induce the more remote with political connections, hence Don Alonso de Ercilla's image of "el estado indómito" was much more than a flight of poetic fancy.[31]

It is virtually certain that the Indians, in pre-Hispanic days, were in the habit of making transient familial and friendship alliances in the conduct of war between localities. Upon their first major defeat by Valdivia, following which he pursued the Biobío and founded Concepción, the more intelligent Indian leaders raised a wide call to arms.[32] The resulting alliance was effective in that it led to the downfall of Valdivia, but it had no permanent character. With each new Spanish thrust the recipes of the revolt had to reform alliances and seek wider support for their efforts. In 1598, for example, Loncoyo and the chiefs established relations with the Indians of Santiago, attempting to incite them to rebellion.[33] Temporary alliances were both frequent and effective. In search of allies the chiefs used glass beads, dogs, and various types of Spanish plunder to effect

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29 Ovalle, p. 33. The area included the Indian localities of Talcamavida, Lonquilla, Canete, Marigueñu, Angol, Arauco, Andalicán, Tucapel, and Purén. After the empire had been conquered as a political entity the term was applied to all or part of it. In general, the term usually came to mean the center of Indian resistance, whether it embraced all of the above named provinces or validly one of them.

30 Alonso de Ercilla y Zúñiga, ed., José Toribio Medina, La Araucana (2 vols., Santiago, 1910). Historians and anthropologists seem to be under a strange compulsion to use this poem as a prime documentary source. This is not to say that its other literary merits should be overlooked, but the only use to which it has been put seems completely to fail to question Ercilla's basic data. Even a quick look at it, although without any of the possible or alternate proofs where it applies.

31 Encomienda, pp. 22-23. It will merit close study to explain the first rebellion. It is sometimes implied that the Araucanians were immediately on subjugation sullenly effort on a large scale through encomienda terminated by the force. This effort seems unlikely because the force were held at the Maule River, and the Indians occupying this area, as nearly as can be ascertained, were the earliest Promaucaes, who were not Araucanians. The revolt the first invasion have had anything to do with the formation of the militia alone, as we have seen, it was caused by the imposition of Spanish institutions, evidence which it would have had no meaning.

32 Ibid., pp. 43-45.

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expeditions.[1] There also developed a type of Indian encomero who supplied his [illegible] own weapons and served for a specified length of time or a prearranged scale of [illegible] pay.[2]

In some quite clear that there was no pre-Encomienda assistance to which the [illegible] people could appeal. When local chiefs were asked for troops they are reported [illegible] to have responded the request. If they acceded to the demand, they chose the bravest man for a leader and dispatched the force under his command. Service was performed in the people's terms for no more consideration than lodging and the [illegible] customary gratuities. In the event of mortality the close relatives of the fallen warrior were compensated by the residents of the province to whose defense he died.[3]

Some of the Indians simply did not want to fight the Spaniards, preferring [illegible] to make the best of conditions under Spanish rule. The Indians around Angol, [illegible] for instance, joined the Spaniards in war against the rebels for a number of years. [illegible] While the rebels Indians accused them of subverting the general Indian cause, [illegible] the Angol tribes continued with accusations of plunder and theft.[4] The rebels, with its own crops destroyed by warfare, were hastened to visit the stores of those who were not immediately allied to the cause. Encomiendas who refused to fight were subjected to violent reprisal.[5] Even in the province of Arauco all was not unanimity. An old chief was found to live with his family and who refuge in the Spanish fort in Arauco because he would not support the war, thereby giving evidence of pro-Spanish sympathies.[6] It is difficult to guess how many others there might have been.

By 1598, according to Ovalle, the rebels claimed sovereignty over all of [illegible] the territories from the Biobío to the Imperial River, and was held in dread by all of the Indians in the south as Chonos. The rebels was so feared and respected, he said, that Indians in the extreme south would break the peace when the chiefs of the rebels so desired.[7] Nevertheless, the chiefs were successful in gaining effective ascendancy over the purposes of war. Authority continued to be local,

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1) Silva, pp. 125, 126.
2) Jose A. Ovalle, "Relación de la guerra de Chile" (CHC, vol. I, p. 211).
3) Ovalle, p. 21.
4) Encomiendas, pp. 134-137.
5) Silva, p. 63. The Indians around the settlement who were friendly towards the Spanish were made subject to the encomienda of the leader's relatives. Crops were burned or stolen, and women and children were carried off to be sold as slaves. See Alonso Garcia Ramón, a Relación (CHC, vol. II, pp. 174, 175); "Relación de Jose de Encomiendas" (Silva, pp. 211-213); Silva, p. 63. Though one of many the rebels sometimes lived friendly Indians or allied against the Spanish. Through encomiendas the Spanish sometimes obtained the men and [illegible] of Indian wives and raising of their crops brought allowances and seeds. See Alonso Garcia Ramón, a Relación, Encomiendas (CHC, vol. I, pp. 174-175).
6) Encomiendas, pp. 134-135.
7) Ovalle, p. 21.

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[53] rather than control, and subjugation was more often found in the realm of diplomacy.

With the rise of the century a more precise political and military division was created by the Aconcaguas. The region between the Diaito and Toledo Rivers was divided into three longitudinal strips called *homenajes*; they were the sub-Andean range, the coastal valley, and the coastal strip (including the coastal). Each homenaje had clearly defined limits and jurisdictions; each had, at least at time of war, a principal chief, or *cupac*. It was customary for the chiefs to declare plans for war in a preliminary junta in which the three territories were represented. Strategy was agreed upon by common consent.[47] The relationship between the local chiefs and territorial *cupacs* is not clear, but it seems likely that military power was held in both quality states and to assure authority. When disagreements occurred between *cupacs*, war between territories could and did sometimes develop.[48]

Cristóbal Perez, writing around 1720, describes a further development of this general scheme. At this time the territorial units had been increased to four in number. These provinces were still called *homenajes*, but they consisted further south and south than did the older territories. This extension of Aconcagua is more customary as the growth of Aconcaguan strength and confidence. In Perez' description each *homenaje* had a hierarchy of three superior chiefs: a *cupac*-general (commander), a *guiro*-*guiloon* (field commander), and a *guiqui*-*guiloon* (high-route master). While these officers assumed absolute authority in their positions within the provinces, they were inferior to a *cupac*-general who apparently wielded a measure of authority over the whole of Aconcagua. He further describes a consultation of diplomacy involving three forms for the calling of war. A [52] general war could be called for only by the *cupac*-general, and at his own discre- [53] tion. When he desired to begin hostilities word was passed to all chiefs through a group of sub-chiefs called *cruzes*. Only the *cupac*-general could dispatch the envoy, and in the event of hostilities between the provinces, the law of being called to council by a *cruz* was a guarantee of safe conduct. All chiefs attended the councils, wherein strategy was planned and forces drawn up.

War could also be called for by a regional *cupac*. An envoyage he sent his *guiqui*-*guiloons* to the other *homenajes*, asking their aid and support, which they might or might not give. In the third instance war could be initiated by simply attacking the Spaniards. In this event the warring chiefdom used force

[114] [47] Bourbon, pp. 39-41. Lothrop, the predecessor citizen, pp. 175-176, considers this as he an ancient Hispanic military organization, even though it is first reported almost a century after the Spanish arrival. From what we know of the ancient Hispanics, this could appear to be a valid agricultural organization.

[48] Alden, pp. 39-40, 207-210, "Relativity of Law in Violence," 1911 Chen, II, pp. 181-183.

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of arms to enlist the support of the local Indians for his designs.[42] As incomplete as this description is, it does give evidence of a relatively sophisticated politico-military organization which stands in sharp contrast against that of the first generation of estado caciques.

Development of religious beliefs among the Araucanians is a most difficult postulation because we know so very little about their pre-Hispanic religious ideas. The chroniclers generally agree that the spirits of Araucanian ancestors formed an important cult, each kinship group having an ultimate progenitor whose spirit was called *Pillán*. This spirit was believed to be immanent, and so could be propitiated. Before going into battle the Indians sometimes sought divination from oracles, and once having gained a victory in a given locality through the intercession of supernatural forces, they believed that they could not lose a subsequent battle in that particular place.[43] Given the immediate religious background of the chroniclers of the sixteenth century, one in which religious and nationalistic sentiment were perfectly united, and the omnipresent tradition of the *Reconquista*, one must always wonder if the early chroniclers reported what the Indians actually believed, or if they instead reflected the paths of their own cognition.

As the Spaniards made war in the name of an omnipotent God, the Araucanians appear to have rationalized a deity for their own defense. There were innumerable Pillánes hovering over every locality, and in the absence of concerted missionary effort they doubtless remained. In describing an Araucanian ceremonial that he witnessed in 1629 Bascuñan depicts an interesting bit of symbolism which suggests the evolution of a super-Pillán. The occasion of ceremony was the execution of a Spanish captive. Involved in the execution was a lance with three knives fixed to its end, representing the three butanmapos. After the captive's brains had been dashed out, his captor took from the lance that knife which represented his personal region of Araucanía and used it to cut out the victim's heart. He sucked its blood, took tobacco smoke and blew it to the heavens, then passed the heart around to the other chiefs for similar usage, after which it was divided and eaten.[44] The three knives symbolized Araucanía, and the sucking of blood was a

42 Gerónimo Pizarro, "Noticias sobre los encumbres de los Araucanos" (Gay, II, pp. 489-493).

43 Manuscrito, p. 172; Núñez, p. 49; also see Latcham, *La prehistoria chilena*, pp. 193-194. Cooper (pp. 742-752) makes a noble attempt to unravel the confused threads of early Araucanian religious belief.

44 Bascuñan, pp. 39-43. The author was a captain of Spanish infantry and the son of Alonso Núñez de Pineda, *maestro de campo general*, one of Chile's distinguished soldiers. In 1629 the Araucanians crossed the Biobío and fell on Chillán. They captured Bascuñan and took him back to their stronghold. His captivity was one of those story book affairs, almost too romantic and dramatic to be real. He was befriended by Maulican, a powerful chieftain

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form of thanksgiving to the Pillán for victory. This ceremony closely approaches the abstraction of Home, Country, and God.

Later in his captivity Bascuñan had occasion to spend several days in the company of one of the small sons of a chief. One afternoon he asked the child if he would like to learn how to pray. The boy answered affirmatively; he had already learned something of prayers from a Spanish captive. With little instruction the child recited the Pater Noster in Spanish, but without understanding what it was he was reciting. Bascuñan, speaking Araucanian fluently, decided to teach him in the Araucanian tongue. The child was delighted to understand the recitation. The trenchant Bascuñan then asked him if he understood the idea behind the prayer. Yes indeed, was the reply. God could be none other than a great Pillán, superior to other Pilláns.[45] Bascuñan registered satisfied delight. The question is, should he have been so delighted?

In order to maintain a spirit of unqualified resistance the leaders of the estado, who manipulated majority opinion, instituted indoctrinational forms for boys and youths. Beginning at six years of age boys were taught the use of military weapons. By observing him the boy's tutors would decide which weapon he was most proficient with, and then he would be trained as a specialist in the use of that weapon. At the same time he was arduously trained in running and swimming.[46] Another type of training begun at this early age was the torture of Spanish captives. The boys were given knives and living Spaniards, then instructed in the arts of slow dissection, roasting, and eating.[47] They were further required to memorize certain verses which recounted Spanish offenses since the beginning of the war, and were made to recite them at the command of their elders. In this way a boy became a man with a clearly fixed purpose in life. As a youth the Araucanian would speak thus of his lance:

> This is my master: it does not order me to dig for gold, or carry food or firewood, nor to herd cattle, or to follow it about. And since this master sustains my liberty, it is with him that I wish to pass.[48]

There was seldom talk of peace in the estado. Even a chief, if he dared speak

of the estado, and likewise the son of a famous warrior. When the other chiefs learned of Bascuñan's identity they demanded his head to use as a trophy to incite peaceful Indians to war. By chicanery and ruse Maulican saved him, and after some months of comfortable captivity returned him to his own people. His account of the adventure is invaluable, although it is somewhat tiresome to read. He was a creole and educated in Chile. He apparently felt compelled to show that a creole scholar could hold his own with a peninsular, hence his excessive quotation from and reference to classical authors.

45 Bascuñan, pp. 155-156. Also see Córdoba y Figueroa, *Historia de Chile* (CHC, vol. 2, p. 36).

46 Olaverría, p. 23.

47 Nájera, p. 60.

48 *Idem*, pp. 61, 105.

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of peace in war council, could be cut down on the spot by the nearest soldier. Apparently it was quite common for the warriors to kill any Indian who spoke of peace, or who was suspected of having the word in his mouth. Nájera describes a rigorous "inquisition" by the warriors to suppress the minority who wanted to farm rather than fight. Christianity was also forbidden. In the course of time many Indians were introduced to its tenets through close contact with the Spanish, especially the Indians who lived around the Spanish settlements. After the disaster of 1598, of course, the towns were no more. Many of the Indians had become reconciled to Spanish occupation and were genuinely converted to Christianity. Now they were exposed to the mercy of the estado's inquisitors. From what we know, it did not go well with them.[49] Standing in opposition to Christianity was an apparently well-defined Araucanian concept, to wit: the Indian way of life is the only one; those who die in war against the Spanish go to another land where they enjoy more women and luxuries than they ever had in this life; there is nothing to fear in death.[50]

Araucanian opposition to Spanish intrusion was not confined to the field of battle. At all times they waged psychological warfare with consummate skill. While they always celebrated a victory over the Spaniards, and let the settlers know of their celebration, they never disclosed the identity of the fort or community that had fallen.[51] With great finesse they obstructed Spanish intelligence, keeping the enemy in a state of worried ignorance. It is relatively certain that human flesh was not eaten by the Araucanians in pre-Hispanic times except in times of dire necessity.[52] With the advent of the Spanish invasion, however, the eating of Spaniards became institutionalized. Time and time again the chroniclers tell of Spaniards being eaten, in whole and in part, and sometimes, their horses with them. Since there does not appear to have been a tradition to support this practice, nor any magical or superstitious belief connected with the act, it seems reasonable to assume that it was developed for its propaganda value. This would represent an intended clash of values. Discovering the abhorrence with which the Christians viewed cannibalism, the Araucanians appear to have developed it as a cultural opposite, a symbol of resistance. The great chief of Arauco, Caupolican, in hurling a challenge at Governor García Hurtado de Mendoza, boasted that

49 *Idem*, pp. 100, 119, 60, 163, 70; "Trando de la importancia y utilidad que ay en dar por esclavos a los indios rebelados de Chile," 1599 (José Toribio Medina, *Biblioteca hispano-chilena, 1523-1817*, 3 vols., Santiago, 1897-99), vol. 2, p. 13.

50 Olaverría, p. 40.

51 Nájera, pp. 75-76, 98, 100.

52 See Cooper, p. 732 and José Toribio Medina, *Las aborígines de Chile* (Santiago, 1952), pp. 220-221. Marmolejo (p. 57) states that in the spring of 1556 the Indians were visited by a terrible plague (called *chavalongo*). In the aftermath of famine the Indians turned to cannibalism as a means of survival.

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723 266 he had eaten the previous governor (Valdivia) and would do the same with him.[53] In some cases, even the well-picked bones of Spaniards were consumed in wine after being burned and powdered, the idea being that no memory of the Spaniards should remain.[54]

723 727 534 Another Araucanian device was the making of flutes from Spanish shinbones, most often extracted while the victim was still alive. On occasion the victim was forced to play his threnody on his own shin bones.[55] After the Indians developed their own cavalry they used the shinbones in lieu of trumpets. Nájera describes the sound they made as one which was doleful and morose, producing depression in those who heard it.[56] One can but imagine the effect on the settlers produced by a night-riding horde, sweeping over the country side, accompanied by its unearthly music.

723 727 The Araucanians had still other ways to indicate their scorn for Spanish culture. On occasions they cut limbs and made crosses upon which to crucify their captives before roasting and eating them.[57] In their treatment of captive Spanish women the Indians made calculated mockery of the enemy's institutions. The conquerors' ladies were highly prized by the chiefs, who used them as concubinary slaves. In 1605 a new Spanish governor, Don Alonso García Ramón, came down from Lima with 1000 troops. With this show of force he opened negotiations with the caciques of the estado for return of female captives, offering Indian hostages in exchange. The chiefs of Arauco decided to part with some of their prizes, and at the appointed time produced the prisoners. Before waiting husbands and fathers the women appeared, calloused, lousy, naked below the waist, and, [534] more often than not, visibly pregnant.[58] Now we know that the Araucanians had the same ideas of physical propriety as did the Spaniards. Both made the same distinction as to public and private parts of the anatomy.[59] It was by intention alone that the chiefs of Arauco forced their unfortunate victims to appear thus before their menfolk. The chiefs of Purén, although they liked the Spanish no better, provided coverings with which their captives could hide their shame.[60]

177 121 The foregoing brief review of Araucanian culture in its history has embraced the outward manifestations of change rather than its internal mutations. Two principal aims have directed the study: one intended to restore the chronology

53 García Hurtado de Mendoza, "Relación" (Gay, I, pp. 183-184).
54 Nájera, p. 54.
55 *Idem*, pp. 53-54, 54-57.
56 *Idem*, p. 115.
57 *Idem*, p. 58.
58 Nájera, pp. 118, 67-71. The author also stated that over 500 Spanish women had been taken captive and at the time of writing some 200 remained in captivity (pp. 37-38).
59 *Idem*, pp. 46-47.
60 *Idem*, p. 69.

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which is so basic to cultural history; the other to divert study of the problem of Araucanian resistance from narrow analysis of Spanish strength and weakness. It is apparent that understanding is to be found in the sphere of Araucanian cultural experience. In plowing the furrow it is inevitable that questions tentatively answered should suggest a multitude of new ones laying deeper beneath the surface.[61] With more intensified study, surface appearances which now seem to be certainties will doubtless be proved to be more apparent than real. Even so, we can better understand why an observation made by a historian in the middle of the eighteenth century could, with small exception, have been made in the sixteenth:

> In a short time the Spanish conquered the three powerful empires of the American hemisphere, those of Peru, Mexico, and Bogotá, but the hundred and ninety years that have elapsed since the beginning of this conquest have not sufficed to end it with the subjugation of the Araucanians. Nor has the vast expenditure of fifty million pesos and more than 25,000 recruits, nor the effusion of blood that has been spilled done so, even though in the past century the King declared this war to be equal to those of Spain, Flanders, and Italy. Today the Araucanians possess the fairest portions of Chile, from the Biobío River to the Straits of Chiloé, a hundred and fifty leagues stretching between the Cordillera and the sea. In the whole of this area the Spanish hold nothing but the fortified towns of Arauco and Valdivia: the Indians live in independence and enjoyment of their coveted liberty.[62]

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61 One such problem is suggested by the sources. In pre-Hispanic days the Araucanians were sedentary farmers of predominantly vegetarian habits. Frequent mention is made in the documents of a growing cattle economy, especially in Spanish sheep and goats. Inasmuch as warfare disrupted agricultural planting in the valleys, the Araucanians moved their fields to impenetrable sierras. It may be that lower yields in the mountains created a greater need for animal foodstuffs to supplement lowered agricultural production. See, for example, Julián de Bastida to Don García Hurtado de Mendoza, Nov. 15, 1563 (CHC, vol. 29, p. 498); Olaverría, pp. 36-38; Marmolejo, pp. 76-77; Nájera, p. 23. The implications suggested in a shift of basic economy are highly significant and require further investigation.

62 *Córdoba y Figueroa, Historia de Chile* (CHC, vol. 2, p. 29). His statistics seem to be far from the mark. In 1664 the casualty figures, as Latcham reports them, were 29,000 Spaniards and 60,000 Indians allies ("La especidad guerrera de los Araucanos," p. 58).